The Death of Benazir Bhutto

The assassination of former prime minister Benazir Bhutto of Pakistan has elicited tremendous comment from international relations experts and non-experts worldwide - for good reason. In the words of Hasan Askari Rizvi, Annual Pakistan Studies Scholar

at SAIS: "An important liberal and moderate leader has been lost."

Juan Cole offers his typically comprehensive summary of the latest on events surrounding Mrs. Bhutto's burial near Larkana in Sindh Province.

A list of interesting perspectives follows below.

Democracy Arsenal offers video footage of an important last interview by David Frost of Mrs. Bhutto in which she raises specific concerns regarding illiberal, extremist elements in Pakistan and the encouragement given to their existence by the prolonged rule of General Pervez Musharraf's dictatorship.

Naturally, this tragedy is being debated among leading citizens in Texas. Via The Agonist, Stirling Newberry offers this insight:

Bhutto's death merely confirms what should be obvious by now: creation of
Pakistan as a military state will, in the not very long run, produce a country
which is a greater threat to global security than Baathist Iraq was.

Similarly, Dr. Farzana Shaikh of Chatham House notes:

... while there have been notable successes in the capture of wanted Al Qaeda
suspects, the hunt for senior Taliban leaders has proved less rewarding. It has
fuelled suspicion that, despite his formal repudiation of Pakistan's support for
the Taliban, Musharraf remains committed - as are his intelligence agencies - to
the installation of a friendly government in Afghanistan that could eventually
neutralise the threat of a 'pincer movement' against Pakistan, involving India
and Afghanistan.

Usama bin Laden and Al Qaeda are suspected of involvement in this dramatic assassination, but the group has not yet taken credit for the act, in a pattern reminiscent of the long period of time following the events of September 11, 2001 before the group acknowledged its involvement in that attack on the United States. What is clear from Mrs. Bhutto's interview with David Frost and a variety of sources is that parts of Pakistan remain welcoming havens for Al Qaeda members and are dominated by Pakistanis who sympathize with Al Qaeda's causes as they are expressed in the 1998 fatwa and other public declarations.

Strangely, shock and awe in Iraq have failed to defeat Al Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Mrs. Bhutto's assasination will certainly be debated in the context of the U.S. presidential nomination process as well as in the general election season. Some Democrats have called for an investigation of the facts surrounding this crime buttressed by foreign law enforcement services. Formerly Republican Mayor Michael Bloomberg astutely perceives the connection between the safety and security of the people of New York and the emergence of liberal democracy in Pakistan over time.

The obligations under international law of a dictator to permit a proper inquiry to establish the facts of this crime will certainly be investigated by international lawyers working for concerned governments. Due to the sensitivities involved, a United Nations Commission might be the only acceptable solution.

Interestingly, Dr. Shaikh diagnoses Pakistan's dilemma with liberal democracy but offers precisely the wrong prescription.

Neither Musharraf nor Bhutto can expect to win the struggle against Islamic
militancy without a clear mandate to do so. This entails urgently restoring
civilian rule - however flawed - through free and fair elections, to help
Pakistan embark on its long delayed transition from martial to constitutional
law.

Any effort by Pervez Musharraf or his successor to secure a "genuinely negotiated political consensus" or a "clear mandate" will depend in the near term on satisfying a large illiberal faction - if not a majority - of Pakistani society. The difficult paradox here is that stability and some modicum of liberal governance that can keep religious, theocratic extremism at bay depends on the continuation of authoritarian rule capable of dealing harshly with violent religious fanatics both in the urban centers Benazir Bhutto identified in the Frost interview and in the lawless regions of the country. As in Iraq, democracy is not the solution to Pakistan's problems. The emergence of liberal democracy over the very long term is. The challenge for the outside world affected by currents in Pakistan and interested in durable stability and security is to determine what can be done to help promote liberal democratic practice of a uniquely Pakistani variety. Clearly, such an ambitious undertaking has no chance without a large scale multilateral enterprise supported diplomatically, politically and financially by some of the permanent 5 members of the United Nations Security Council (the United States, United Kingdom, France at minimum) as well as India and the Arab League. It is in the collective interest of these nations to do so.

The Times of India (Dec. 28, 2007) analyzes prospects for Benazir Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party following the postponement of the formerly planned January 8th elections.

The names of Bhutto's trusted aide Makhdoom Amin Fahim, her husband Asif Ali
Zardari and senior lawyer Aitzaz Ahsan as her successor are doing the rounds.

Arab News (Dec. 30, 2007) presents an editorial in favor of statesmanship.

There are those who say that throughout its history, Pakistan has lurched from
one political crisis to another and that the country will once again muddle
through. They are wrong. Pakistanis now face a new and utterly insidious threat
from the forces of terrorism. They will stop at absolutely nothing to destroy —
not only President Musharraf’s administration but all democratic politicians who
are jockeying for power. The prize is easy to see. Pakistan is a nuclear nation.
If the country can be reduced to chaos by terrorism compounded by squabbling
politicians, there is no telling how close the kinds of Al-Qaeda might get to
the nuclear trigger. What is needed now from all political leaders is
statesmanship, not self-interest.

Le Monde (Dec. 27, 2007) offers an interview (in French) of the Wilson School's Zia Mian.

En 2002, les partis islamistes ont tous voté au Parlement pakistanais pour
Musharraf, dont le pouvoir était issu d'un putsch. Et lui a conclu un pacte avec
eux : soutenez-nous à Islamabad, vous serez libres de gérer vos zones. L'aspect
masqué est que, des années durant, l'ISI, le service secret, a équipé et
entraîné les talibans, très présents dans ces zones, jusqu'à leur prise de
pouvoir en Afghanistan. Ils ont aussi armé les islamistes au Cachemire face à
l'Inde. L'ISI bâtit ces passerelles pour des raisons géostratégiques, pas
idéologiques.

El Pais (Dec. 29, 2007) summarizes the earliest state of the facts (in Spanish).

The Financial Times (Dec. 28, 2007) summarizes the risks to state stability and the security of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal.

Pakistan keeps its nuclear facilities under heavy guard, but lacks the latest
material control and accounting technologies, according to a recent report by
Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government on behalf of the Nuclear Threat
Initiative, a non-proliferation advocacy group.